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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff & Respondent

Case No.

vs.
JOHN R NEWBOLD dba
STEREO VILLA,

10632

Defendant & Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, District Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appeal from order granting summary judgment on
question of whether seller is entitled to repossess sign
sold on conditional sale, retain payments made to time of
repossession, resell the sign, retaining the proceeds thereof for its own use and benefit, giving defendant no credit
therefor, and sue for the remainder of the purchase price.

2

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On January 18, 1966, the Honorable Joseph Jeppsoa
judge of the district court, ordered the action dismissc
grantmg permission to refile an amended complaint or "
move the court to reconsider. Plaintiff filed a motion e
reconsider which was heard before another judge of ji
district court, Honorable Leonard W. Elton, who grant1
summary judgment for the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order of Judge Eltr
granting summary judgment, and a reinstatement oft
original order of dismissal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 31, 1963, defendant purchased a sign l
use in his business from defendant for the total price
$277.95. See exhibit P-1 included in the record hem
Defendant paid $100.00 down and agreed to pay the br
ance of $177.95 in two equal monthly installments begi
ning with the month of January, 1964, with intenoJ
thereon at the rate of 8% per year on all past due inst8ti
ments. Defendant defaulted in his payments immediatef
1
thereafter, and has paid nothing on the contract exce
for the $100.00 down payment. Plaintiff subsequently rA
possessed the sign and resold it. Thereafter, apparentlyL
reliance upon the provisions of paragraph 4 of the cC
tract which provided that in the event of default plaintc
could remove the sign from defendant's premises "a
retain the same and the payments theretofore ma
thereon by the vendee for the use of said SIGN," / 1
paragraph 6 which provided the "SIGN has no valuP:

3
when repossessed, suit was commenced for the full

1soamount of the contract balance of $177.95. The matter

;scwas brought on for pretrial before Judge Jeppson who

>r
n entered the following order:

"The court was of the opinion that it was against
public policy for the plaintiff to obtain the repossession of the sign, together with the full purchase price,
and inasmuch as the defendant was not in a position
to show that the merchandise was lawfully foreclosed, and that the defendant was credited with the
value of the merchandise at the time of repossession,
the Court at Pretrial dismissed the action with permission given to the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint on or before the 28th day of January, 1966.
In the event it is not filed, this dismissal is with
prejudice."

ji

nt1

:e

~gi

The court also granted permission to bring the matter

~non

for reconsideration provided a motion for such was

1

t8riled before the said 28th day of January. A motion was
1te
filed and hearing thereon continued to the 19th day of
:ce
Y1April, 1966 at which time it was heard before Judge
lyLeonard W. Elton, another judge of the Third District
cCourt who granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.
nt(R-13)

"a

m Plaintiff thereafter filed his notice of appeal (R-14)

jnd it is at this point that the case is now before the SuuuPreme Court.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE ELTON INVOLVIM
THE EXACT SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LA\'
THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON B'
JUDGE JEPPSON WS IMPROPER AND CONTRAR'
TO ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMrn
ISTRATION
It has long been a principle of the common law th,
courts of equal jurisdiction will not interfere with pn

ceedings before another court or before another judger
the same court. During the time when the law and equit
courts were separated, equity oft times intervened in pn
ceedings before the law courts to correct or prevent a
injustice, but even there, such interferance was cautiorn
ly and judiciously interposed.
Since the merger of both the law courts and the equit
courts into one court, it has been the practice for cour:
of equal jurisdiction to refuse to review the actions r
judgments of one another. The district courts of the Stat
of Utah, of course, have both law and equity powers corr
bined into one and the same court, and it is therefor
improper for one division of the District Court of Sa
Lake County to overrule or interfere in any manner wit
the rulings of any other division.
The Montana Court has had occasion to rule on th
very matter, and the case of State ex. rel. Carrell·
District Court, 50 Mont. 428, 147 P. 612, is precisely 1
point. In June, 1912, in department 2 of the District Cou'
in Lewis and Clark County, one Joseph J. Carrell w:
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nl;pointed guardian of the person and estate of one Mary
Mmphey, an incompetant some 80 years old. In January,
J915, the daughter of Mary Murphey, one Mrs. Nett, petitioned to have her mother declared competent. The
hearing was held in department 2 and the petition denied.
A writ of habeas corpus was immediately sued out in
behalf of Mrs. Murphey in department 1, another department of the same court. The writ was issued, hearing held
in department 1, and Mrs. Murphey discharged. The
guardian, however was not relieved of his duties in regard to the estate, and consequently appealed to tihe SuprPme Court. The order discharging Mrs. Murphey was
overruled on the ground, among others, that the discharge on the habeas corpus writ was based upon the fact
of the competency of the respondent which fact had already been adjudicated in department 2 on the petition
to have her restored to competency. The court said:
"That adjudication should have ended the matter,
except for causes arising subsequently thereto. The
two departments of the district court are coordinate.
Neither possesses any appellate or supervisory control over the other, and when one has spoken upon a
matter properly before it, a due sense of propriety
alone ought to be sufficient to stay interference by
the other."
"When the application for restoration was denied in
dept. No. 2, Mrs. Nett (Mrs. Murphey's daughter)
was forbidden by statute (Section 6324 Rev. Codes)
the right to renew it before the other department,
and yet if this order now under review be permitted
to stand, she will have accomplished by indirection
the very thing she is forbidden to do directly."

6
Section 6324 Rev. Codes, now 93-1101 Rev. Codes, 194
is substantially identicle with 78-7-19, U.C.A., 1953, whic
provides as follows:
"REPEATED APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS FOF,
BIDDEN - If an application for an order, made to
judge of a court in which the action or proceeding
pending, is refused in whole or in part, or is grantc
conditionally, no subsequent application for the sarr
order can be made to any other Judge except of
higher court; but nothing in this section applies 1
motions refused for any informality in the papers r
proceeding necessary to obtain the order, or to mi
tions refused with liberty to renew the same."
The statute, of course, merely gives the force of statu!
law to the principle as it has been observed by the cour
for centuries, making clear, however, that mere failUJ
of formality would not be a bar to a renewed motion l
the same grounds. The reason for the rule is well stah
in the case of Lutey Bros. v. Jackson, County atty., et. a
(Montana 1918), 179 P. 459.
"It must therefore be constantly borne in mind the
while there may be more than one department co:
stituting a district court in this state, it is still b:
one court-one judicial establishment-and the a
tion of one of the judges in a matter rightfully pen
ing in the attachment proceeding before him co:
tinued until the matter could be finally and cor
pletely disposed of, and was absolute. While the o
servance of this principle might be required l
grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it is a ru
essential to the dignity and just authority of eve1
court, and its proper observance is necessary in ord
that unseemly and discreditable conflicts may i
avoided."
1
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The reLJ. uirements of judicial comity and courtesy alone
woL!ld be enough to require a reversal of the order of

Judge Elton in this case. Add to that the mandate of
Statute law forbidding repeated applications to different
judges upon the same grounds, and the proposition becomes inescapable.
The statute does provide that nothing therein shall apply to motions denied with liberty to renew the same.
This provision can only make sense if read to mean with
liberty to renew the same before a different judge. Apart
from statute, the common law has forbidden repeated
applications, even to the same judge, on the same grounds
once a ruling has been had on the merits. Even before
the same judge a motion to be renewed must be based
upon a new state of facts or conditions, or upon excusable neglect of the moving party to present the facts as
they were at the original hearing. See 60 C.J.S. Motions
and Orders, Section 44 et. seq.
In the instant case no new matter of fact or of law was
1

1

alleged or argued before Judge Elton. In fact the motion
as submitted (R-10, 11) recited that "Said motion shall
be based on the pleadings of the parties hereto and the

1
1

Law of Contracts." This, of course was the very ground
upon which the motion was argued in the first place before Judge Jeppson.
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POINT II
THE PURPORTED JUDGMENT OF JUDGE ELTm
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFI
IS INVALID FOR THE REASON THAT THE ORIG
INAL ORDER OF JUDGE JEPPSON DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WAS NEVER V ACATEI
OR SET ASIDE.
The pretrial order dated January 18, 1965, signed b:
Judge Joseph Jeppson states that "the Court at Pretria
dismissed the action with permission given to the plain
tiff to file an amended complaint on or before the 28tl
day of January, on or before the 28th day of January
1966. In the event it is not filed, this dismissal is wit)
prejudice." The court then granted permission to argui
a motion to reconsider provided said motion were file(
before the said 28th day of January. Pursuant to motior
filed January 27, 1966, the matter was reheard befon
Judge Elton and summary judgment given plaintiff.
As a matter of good practice, and in order to avoid con
fusion the court must vacate a prior order before enter
ing a new or different order pertaining to the same sub
ject matter. As the record now stands, the plaintiff's corn
plaint was dismissed with prejudice and the same plain
tiff later granted summary judgment on the complain
that had been previously dismissed. No order vacatin
or setting aside the dismissal was ever entered. For th1
reason the order of summary judgment should be n
versed and the matter remanded to the district court fo
rehearing before the proper judge.

1

1

1

t

o
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POINT III
IJUBLIC POLICY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW

AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM SALES'
ACT REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE HIS ELECTION--RESCIND THE SALE AND RETAKE THE
SIGN; CONFIRM THE SALE AND SUE FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE; OR RETAKE THE SIGN, SELL IT FOR
THE BEST POSSIBLE PRICE REASONABLY OBTAINED AND CREDIT DEFENDANT WITH THE NET
AMOUNT RECOVERED.
The law of sales, both under the common law, and the
Uniform Sales Act clearly dictates a reversal of the order
granting summary judgment in this case. The case of
I.X.L. Stores Co. v. Moon (1916), 49 U. 262, 162 P. 622 is
a case decided one year prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act in Utah, and is exactly in point with the
instant case. In that case the plaintiff had sued on two
notes given in connection with a conditional sale contract. About 30 days after the goods were sold and delivered to the defendant he became convinced he could
not pay for them, called the plaintiff and asked them to
take the goods back. Plaintiff thereupon took all of the
said goods and sued for the full purchase price upon the
notes. The trial court gave judgment as a matter of law
to the defendant. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
The court stated the question involved thusly:
"What are the legal rights of a vendor of personal
property as against the vendee in case the vendor
retains the title of the property until the purchase
price is fully paid and in case of default of payment
of the purchase price, or any part thereof, the vendor
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repossesses himself of the property which is the subject of sale, either with or without the consent of
the vendee ?"
In answer to the question the court stated:
"We are clearly of the opinion when the plaintiff,
although at the request and with the consent of the
defendant, unconditionally repossessed itself of the
property which was the subject of the conditional
sale and retained the same, it waived any other remedy that it might have had under the contract, and it
is now precluded from maintaining an action upon
the notes or for the purchase price of the goods. The
court, therefore, committed no error in its conclusion
of law and in entering judgment for the defendant ...
"Of course the vendor cannot take two bites out of
the same cherry. He may not with one hand treat
the contract as rescinded, and retake the goods, and
with the other treat it as in force, and sue on it as
subsisting and recover full compensation for its
breaches without even offering to give credit for reasonable value of the goods taken and repossessed. As
the authorities say, he may not have the goods and
at the same time the full purchase price. That, in
effect, it what the appellant claims, and that is what
we say and decide he may not do . . . Here the appellant chooses, unconditionally, to retake and repossess, and then also seeks to enforce the contract
and recover full compensation thereon as though
there had been no retaking. He may not do that."
(Emphasis added)
The court cited and relied upon the following texts and
authorities: I Mecham on Sales, sections 615; 616 Cyc
896; Parke v. White River L. Co., 101 Cal. 37, 35 P. 441
(wherein the California court stated that "the plaintifl
could either recover the property or sue for the purchase
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price. But the pursuit of one remedy necessarily excluded
the other. It (the plaintiff) was not entitled both to the
purchase price and the property."); Bailey v. Hervey, 135
Mass. 174; Butler v. Hildreth, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 49; Frisch
v. Wells, 200 Mass 429, 86 N.E. 775, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) S
144; Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal 353, 42 P. 435; Smith
v" Barber, 153 Ind. 322, 52 N.E. 1014. For other cases on
this point see Sales, Key No. 479 (11), Sales, Cent. Dig.
Section 1431. The above case is typical of the many jurisdictions requiring the seller to make his election, and
denying him the opportunity to pursue mutually exclusive remedies. Plaintiff in the instant case must either
( 1) sue for the purchase price, in which case he is required to redeliver the sign; (2) rescind the sale and take
the sign back unconditionally; or (3) retake the sign,
resell it for the buyer's account, credit him with the net
amount realized, and sue for the difference between the
market value (most likely evidenced by the price obtained from a reasonable attempt to sell at a fair price)
and the contract price. In any event, the seller cannot retake the sign unconditionally, which amounts to a rescission, and at the same time sue for the full purchase price.
78 C.J.S., Sales Section 389 states:
"Where the seller has once elected his remedy, he
may not thereafter elect, resort to, or pursue another
and inconsistent one."
"The seller may not pursue two inconsistent remedies at the same time, either in the same action or
in different actions, and, where he has once elected
his remedy, he may not thereafter elect, resort to,
or pursue another and inconsistent one."
In the case of Bresslin - Griffitt Carpet Co. v. Asador-
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ian, Mo. App., 145 S.W.2d. 494 as quoted in 78 C.J.S.,
10 note 17, it was held that:
l

"Where a portion of goods which had been sold an
delivered, was returned to the seller, the seller coul
refuse to accept the goods and sue for the full pu:
chase price, accept the goods at the invoice price ar1
so credit the buyers account, or sell the goods fl
the buyer's account at the best price obtainable an
sue for the difference between the proceeds of SU(
sale and the invoice price of the goods."
Section 60-4-2, U.C.A., 1953 provides the remedil
available to the unpaid seller:
" ( 1) Subject to the provisions of this title, notwitt
standing that the property in the goods may hm
passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller of goods,:
such has:
(a) A lien on the goods or right to retain them f1
the price while he is in possession of them.
(b)

( c) A right of resale as limited by this title
( d) A right to rescind the sale as limited by th
title.
This section, outlining the remedies available to tt
unpaid seller clearly limits him to the above altemativi
as limited by 60-4-9 (When and how resale may be madf
and 60-4-10 (When and how seller may rescind the sale
Plaintiff obviously has not chosen to rescind the sale, ar
the only remedy available to him against the goods is'
exercise his right of lien or of resale, either of which r
quires a sale of the goods and credit to the buyers a
count.
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ApJrt from the rights against the goods outlined by
d1apter 4 of the U.C.A. as discussed above, the seller
would have an action for breach of contract as provided
for in chapter 5. 60-5-1 (1) provides that an action may
1: be maintained for the price where the property or title
n to the goods has actually passed to the buyer. This provision is not applicable to the instant case for the reason
n that the sign was sold under a title retaining contract,
and defendant never received title to the goods. Consequently 60-5-1 (3) delimits the seller's rights as follows:

tt

"Although the property in the goods has not passed,
if they cannot readily be resold for a reasonable
price, and if the provisions of section 60-5-2 ( 4) (providing for action where the goods have not been accepted) are not applicable the seller may offer to
deliver the goods to the buyer, and, if the buyer refuses to receive them, may notify the buyer t!hat the
goods are thereafter hold by the seller as bailee for
the buyer. Thereafter the seller may treat the goods
as the buyer's and may maintain an action for the
price."

Section 60-5-2 provides for resale and credit where t!he
goods have not been accepted, and under 60-5-1 (3) the
only condition upon which plaintiff could retain the goods
tt as he has done here, without resale is where they are not
Vi readily resalable, and even there he must stand ready to
lf deliver when the price is paid. Evidence in the instant
:e case would show that the sign was readily resalable, was
ir in fact resold, and that the seller has in all ways since
;' repossession, regarded the sign as his own property and
r not that of the buyer. The whole tenor of the law, both
a at common law, and under the Uniform Sales Act contemplates that the goods are to be resold and credit given
h
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to the buyer for the price obtained. The Utah court in
Holland-Cook Mfg. Co. v. Consolidated Wagon & Ma.
chine Co., 49 U. 43, 161 P. 922 held that the measure of
damages, in an action by the seller to recover the price
of the goods sold, is a matter of general law. The plaintiff
in the instant case utilized the conditional sales agree.
ment as a security device for the payment of the purchase
price. Under the conditions extant in this case he is not
entitled to retain his security, resell it for a substantial
price, and still hold the defaulting buyer for the full purchase price.
Ploinnff, even under general contract law would be
required to do all that he reasonably could to avoid or
mitigate his damages. See Stimpson on Contract 1954
edition, page 538. Nor is a penalty, even though provided
for in the contract recoverable. Stimpson on Contract p.
534.
The court, in granting summary judgment for the
plaintiff had to have relied on the provisions in para·
graphs 4 and 6 of the conditional sale contract. Pam
graph 4 if applied to the facts in this case constitutes '
forfeiture which neither the law nor equity will allow
If the provisions of paragraph 4 were merely an attempt
to determine damages in advance, and the attempt wa:
reasonable, it could be sustained on that ground, but that
is a matter of fact to be determined by the court and tht
jury at trial, and cannot properly be disposed of by mean
of a summary judgment.
Paragraph 6, on the other hand is an attempt to deter
mine in advance what the evidence will be. The fact tha
the parties stipulated that the sign has no value if r€"
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po:.;scssed should be considered by the court or jury in
;u 1·ivmg at the damages to be awarded; but again, it is
not conclusive, and should be submitted along with other
evidence. This is especially true in this case where the
evidence would show that the sign was in fact resold for
a substantial price, which fact, contrary to the statement
in the agreement, more properly establishes the market
price for the sign which is the only criterion upon which
to base additional damages.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is evident that the order granting judgment to the plaintiff should be reversed, the
order of dismissal previously granted should be reinstated, and the matter remanded to the district court of
further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER

Attorney for Appellant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

